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Abstract 
We examine whether equity carve-outs (ECOs) lead to improvements in the functioning of the internal 
capital markets (ICM) of diversified firms. Divestments, including spin-offs, sell-offs and ECOs, can 
be employed by firms to improve allocative efficiency. Equity carve-outs, unlike spin-offs and sell-offs, 
leave the parent’s ICM intact but provide the opportunity to enhance internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. Using a US sample of 354 ECOs completed between 1980 and 2013, we find 
that the allocative efficiency of parents is augmented significantly following ECOs. This increase in 
allocative efficiency is driven by improvements in the governance characteristics of parent companies. 
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1. Introduction 
Whether a conglomerate is an efficient model for a business has been a question for the markets for 
many years. Prior studies have demonstrated that the market valuation of conglomerates is at discount 
to the aggregated individual values of their component businesses (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Lamont, 1997; 
Shin and Stulz, 1998). This undervaluation is generally attributed to the failure of the capital allocation 
function of the conglomerate, i.e. the failure of the Internal Capital Market (ICM). Several authors argue 
that the dysfunctionality of the ICM is due to factors such as the complexity and opacity of the parent’s 
portfolio, and asymmetry of information between divisional managers and top management as well as 
between divisional managers and shareholders (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales, 2000). Academics have also suggested other reasons for the ICM dysfunctionality, 
particularly corporate socialism that provides life support to the weak divisions and starves the strong 
ones of investment funds, as well as the managerial preference to allocate capital according to 
organisational politics, rather than objective value-maximising criteria (Rajan et al., 2000; Stein, 2003).  
To address the putative causes of inefficiency in the parent’s ICM, diversified firms have the 
option to undertake divestments of segments of their business in the form of sell-offs, spin-offs and 
equity carve-outs (ECO). A sell-off is a sale of a business segment to another company, a spin-off is 
the floatation of the divested part in a stock exchange, with the distribution of the shares in that newly 
listed company to the shareholders of the parent, and an ECO is the floatation of the divested part on a 
stock exchange, with the parent selling a minority of share ownership to outside investors. A few studies 
have examined the direct impact of spin-offs and sell-offs on the allocative efficiency of the parent’s 
ICM (Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein, 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Burch and Nanda, 2003; 
Ahn and Denis, 2004; McNeil and Moore, 2005; and Çolak and Whited, 2007). Çolak and Whited 
(2007) conclude that there is no significant improvement in the allocative efficiency of the parent’s 
ICM following these restructuring events. The impact of an ECO on the ICM efficiency of the parent 
has surprisingly received scant attention in the literature; and if such an impact exists, it is not clear 
what drives such changes in the functioning of the parent’s ICM following ECOs. 
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In this paper we examine the efficiency of the ICM in a new and arguably more appropriate 
context, i.e. the ECO. Prior studies report the impact of ECOs only on the parent’s shareholder value 
and the improvement in the parent’s operating performance, drawing indirect inferences about the 
functioning of the parent’s ICM. However, we believe that this approach is consistent with, and not 
necessarily corroborative of, an improvement in the parent’s ICM (Vijh, 2002). Our investigation is, 
therefore, the first study to focus on the direct impact of ECOs on the allocative efficiency of the parent’s 
ICM, a major financial rationale for diversification. In contrast to spin-offs and sell-offs, the advantage 
of using the ECO event for assessing the ICM efficiency of the diversified parent is that ECOs directly 
address some of the putative causes of ICM inefficiency. Independent monitoring of the carved-out 
segment by analysts and investors can mitigate the agency conflict between different managerial levels 
and between the top management and the parent’s shareholders.  
An ECO allows the parent to augment its corporate focus and provide the offspring with greater 
autonomy, while the two business entities continue to maintain a strategic relationship (Schipper and 
Smith, 1986). The external capital market also provides valuable information to the parent regarding 
the prospects of the two businesses as separate units (Nanda, 1991; Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro, 1995). 
As a result, and unlike in spin-offs and sell-offs, monitoring of the offspring by the ECM also has a 
healthy feedback effect on the governance and efficiency of the parent’s ICM. The ECO generally 
provides a mechanism to align the interests of top management in the newly formed company and the 
shareholders by facilitating managerial incentives based on stock market performance (Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1993). For these reasons, we hypothesise that ECOs can lead to a significant increase in the 
parent’s ICM efficiency and that improvements in the internal and external governance of the parent 
contribute significantly to such increase. 
To test these predictions, we use a US sample of ECOs completed between 1980 and 2013. We 
compare the allocative efficiency of the parent firms before and after the ECO and assess the statistical 
significance of any improvement. We employ three different metrics of ICM efficiency following the 
methodology in Çolak and Whited (2007). Two are direct measures of capital allocation (relative 
investment ratio, RINV, and relative value added, RVA) and one is an indirect measure reflecting the 
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change in the parent company valuation (excess value, EXVAL). We also consider the endogeneity that 
can be associated with restructuring events. Any observed improvement in allocative efficiency 
following restructuring can potentially be linked to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the conglomerate 
rather than the restructuring per se. This calls into question studies that point to inefficient ICMs prior 
to restructuring based on the evidence of post-restructuring increases in allocative efficiency. To address 
the issue of endogeneity, our primary methodology employs the Abadie and Imbens (AI) (2006) 
estimator which corrects for the asymptotic bias that can be present in simple matching estimators, such 
as the propensity score matching (PSM) estimator (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). As an additional test of 
the robustness of our results, we analyse the change in allocative efficiency by using the PSM estimator 
and the Heckman (1979) model. Our results based on the AI estimator demonstrate that ECOs lead to 
an improvement in the allocative efficiency of parent firms, consistent with the hypothesis of ICM 
inefficiency in these firms prior to ECO. We observe similar but more robust results using the PSM and 
the Heckman methodologies. 
To test whether the improvements in the functioning of the parent’s ICM are driven by 
enhanced quality of corporate governance in the parent firms, we examine the changes in the internal 
and external corporate governance characteristics of these firms. Specifically, we analyse internal 
corporate governance characteristics such as board duality i.e. non-separation of the board chairman 
and CEO roles, board size, board composition, CEO compensation structure and CEO tenure. The 
external governance characteristics that we investigate include the degree of analyst coverage and the 
accuracy of the analysts’ forecasts, the number of institutional investors on the share register of the 
parent firm and the concentration of their ownership. We show that the analyst coverage of both parent 
and offspring firms increases significantly following the ECO, which suggests that both the parent and 
carved-out unit are exposed to greater stock market scrutiny and greater transparency in the functioning 
of the ICM. We also find improvements in many internal governance characteristics of the parent firms, 
such as greater board independence, smaller board size and CEO compensation based more on stock-
based incentives than cash.  
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More importantly, we demonstrate that the improvement in the parent’s allocative efficiency is 
significantly higher in the firms which experience such positive changes in their internal and external 
governance characteristics. We find that higher analyst coverage and board independence lead to larger 
improvements in the parent’s RINV and RVA. Additionally, higher levels of non-cash CEO 
compensation are positively related to changes in all three measures of the parent’s allocative efficiency. 
Finally, the valuation of the parent firms is significantly enhanced by more analysts following the 
parent, higher proportion of shares owned by institutional investors and higher non-cash CEO 
compensation but is reduced by larger board size and overlap between the roles of the CEO and 
chairperson. This analysis carries important implications for the corporate managers who seek to 
improve the allocative efficiency of their companies by demonstrating that ECOs could be a more 
effective mechanism to restructure company operations than spin-offs and sell-offs. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature on refocusing 
and allocative efficiency as well as the different implications for the ICM following carve-outs and 
other types of refocusing; Section 3 discusses the data sources, describes the methodology and provides 
a full list of variables; Section 4 presents empirical tests of the hypotheses; and the conclusions is 
presented in Section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
One of the important rationales for the conglomerate or diversified business portfolio held by 
companies is that it allows them to allocate their scarce capital more efficiently among the businesses 
in their portfolio than do less diversified firms that rely on the external capital market for debt or equity. 
The conglomerate head office is expected to function as a capital market playing an allocative role and, 
as a result, this market is referred to as the ICM. Such a market is said to have an information advantage 
over investors in the conventional external capital market, which allows the conglomerate head office 
to select potential winners and allocate capital to the highest valued investment opportunities (Stein, 
1997; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004; Anjos and Fracassi, 2011). 
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This benign view of the ICM efficiency has been challenged by several scholars. Some studies 
have provided evidence that conglomerates in the stock market trade at discount to the value of a 
portfolio composed of the individual segments assuming such segments were traded as stand-alone (or 
pure play) entities (Berger and Ofek, 1995). The difference in value between the conglomerate and the 
portfolio of businesses as stand-alone entities is referred to as the conglomerate or diversification 
discount (DD). Several explanations have been offered for the existence of the DD. Among them is a 
dysfunctionality of the ICM arising from both the complexity and diversity of internal politics and the 
agency conflicts between the top managers and divisional managers (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A corollary to this argument is that 
any restructuring of the conglomerate’s portfolio that results in greater focus or reduced complexity 
should improve the efficiency of the ICM. One should therefore observe a significant improvement in 
the allocative efficiency of the parent following such restructuring. Similarly, where the ICM 
inefficiency is caused by the failure of internal governance to prevent capital misallocation due to rent 
seeking, misaligned incentives, corporate socialism etc., one should observe a significant improvement 
in allocative efficiency when governance is improved following a divestment. 
Diversified firms undertake divestments of segments of their business to cure one or more of 
the putative causes of the dysfunctionality of the parent ICM and the DD. The Parent firm’s shareholders 
experience significant positive returns when divestments in the form of sell-off, spin-off and ECO are 
announced, indicating that they are perceived by investors as value creating decisions (Comment and 
Jarrell, 1995; Seward and Walsh, 1996, Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Desai, 
Klock, and Mansi, 2011). Other studies have reported improved operating performance of the parents 
following divestments (John and Ofek, 1995; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Denis and Shome, 2005; 
Klein and Rosenfeld, 2010). These results are consistent with an improvement in the underlying parent’s 
ICM efficiency and a reduction in the DD. They also imply a pre-divestment allocative inefficiency of 
the parent. 
Other studies on divestments have empirically tested the inefficiency of the conglomerate’s 
ICM prior to restructuring by examining the post-restructuring data of the parent and offspring (Ahn 
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and Denis, 2004)1. This approach is however affected by an endogeneity problem. Any observed 
improvement in allocative efficiency following restructuring can potentially be linked to the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the conglomerate rather than the restructuring per se. This calls into 
question studies that point to inefficient ICMs prior to restructuring based on the evidence of post-
restructuring allocative efficiency. In this paper we choose to account for the endogenous nature of the 
ECO decision in the spirit of Çolak and Whited (2007) (CW, hereafter). In particular, CW assess 
whether the allocative efficiency of diversified firms improves significantly following a spin-off or a 
sell-off. In the former event, a business segment becomes a listed entity subject to independent scrutiny 
but there are no direct implications for the efficiency of the parent’s residual portfolio. In the latter event 
the business segment becomes part of the buyer’s portfolio and is shielded from any independent 
monitoring. To assess post-restructuring allocative efficiency, CW advocate using a new methodology 
that addresses the issue of endogeneity. CW find no evidence of significant change in allocative 
efficiencyand conclude that any improvement reported by prior studies is likely to be the artefact of a 
flawed methodology that ignored the endogeneity bias. 
In this sense, the issue of whether diversified parents have dysfunctional ICMs and whether 
divestments contribute to improvements in the allocative efficiency of the parent remains unresolved. 
This is particularly the case in the context of ECOs as a form of divestment. The ECO setting has 
superior conceptual and methodological properties over sell-offs and spin-offs for such investigation. 
An ECO enables the parent to establish the offspring’s value in a more transparent manner. In particular, 
the ECO reduces the information gap that exists between company insiders and the capital market 
participants (i.e. the company outsiders) thanks to the release of information about the offspring in the 
form of regulatory filings and annual financial statements (Desai et al., 2011).2 
                                                          
1 This approach has been held to be methodologically superior to the prior approach of using a stand-alone single 
segment investment opportunity as a proxy for the unobservable investment opportunity of the segments of the 
diversified firm (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Critics of this proxy-based approach to measuring the segment’s 
investment opportunity set have argued that it suffers from endogeneity bias since the conglomerate’s acquisition 
of a segment is self-selected and based on its strategic considerations (Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
2 Nanda (1991), drawing upon Myers and Majluf (1984), however, models the ECO decision as opportunistic, 
designed and timed by the parent to exploit its information advantage as the insider over the investors in the ECM 
and sell stock in the overvalued offspring. Slovin et al. (1995), Slovin and Shushka (1998) and Powers (2003) 
report empirical evidence supportive of the Nanda model. Other studies challenging this information asymmetry 
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Cline, Garner and Yore (2014) argue that diversified firms operating inefficient ICMs tend to 
avoid issuing new equity or debt since the external capital market generally discounts such issues. Such 
external capital market monitoring improves the ICM by means of a feedback loop from investors. 
Habib, Johnson and Naik (1997) support the feedback argument in the context of spin-offs which, like 
ECOs, are subject to external capital market monitoring. In the ECO setting, however, the feedback is 
about both the offspring and the residual parent. Further, the need for a more transparent capital 
allocation between the two and the greater bargaining power of the offspring against the parent can 
improve allocative efficiency (Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek, 1991; Slovin and Shushka, 1998; 
Hulbert, Miles and Woolridge, 2002; Boone, 2003; Triantis, 2002). The greater bargaining power of 
the offspring emanates from its new access to the external capital market and the constraint on any rent-
seeking behaviour by the offspring’s managers. To finance the capital investment needs of the offspring, 
the parent can choose from the options of either raising equity directly or through the offspring. This 
increased financing flexibility can also augment the efficiency of the ICM (Nanda, 1991; Slovin and 
Shushka, 1998).  
At the same time, the carved-out entity can still enjoy most of the synergistic benefits arising 
from joint operations with the parent company. The extent of these synergistic benefits depends on the 
degree of control that the parent continues to maintain over the offspring. Given that the offspring is 
now a separately listed entity, it is not free to enter contracts or other arrangements that are structured 
in favour of the parent to the detriment of the shareholders in the offspring. However, the parent firm 
can employ a range of control levers such as majority ownership, control of the executive composition 
and control of the board of directors to receive favourable treatment. Thus, the parent can still reap the 
potential benefits of preserving the ICM, thereby enhancing its own value (Desai et al., 2011).  
An additional benefit associated with ECOs is that they allow the different residual business 
segments of the parent as well as the offspring to be independently valued by analysts who have 
                                                          
model provide evidence that the observed shareholder value gains are supported by improvement in the operating 
performance of both the parent and the offspring (Vijh, 2002). Hulbert et al. (2002) argue that such operational 
improvement is inconsistent with the Nanda model of the parent exploiting overvaluation by external capital 
markets. In our study we focus on the operating performance of the parent as manifested in the improvement of 
the parent ICM functioning.  
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developed expertise in their respective industries. This is consistent with the literature which shows that 
the number of covering analysts increases and their specialisation improves following ECOs (Schipper 
and Smith, 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Gilson, Healy, Noe and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, the management 
of the offspring can be rewarded with its own stock following ECO, thereby enhancing the alignment 
of the interest of managers and shareholders (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Schipper and Smith, 1986). 
There is also evidence that the adoption of segment-based incentive plans could exert a positive 
influence on the quality of employees that either the offspring or the parent can hire (Kumar and 
Sopariwala, 1992). Such incentive alignment enhances both the offspring’s and parent’s valuations. 
This channel of efficiency enhancement of the parent is not available in spin-offs and sell-offs since the 
spun-off or sold-off segment has no bearing on the performance of the parent. Hulbert et al. (2002) 
argue that the incentive alignment of the managers of carved-out units through stock-based 
compensation will incentivise both the carved-out and parent firms to improve their operating 
performance. Stock-based compensation is also likely to reward the parent’s managers if their ECO 
decision is value enhancing and results in higher market valuation of the parent, which should be the 
rationale behind such a decision. 
In the ECO setting, the financing and investment cash flows between the two entities are more 
transparent and more rigorously monitored by analysts and investors. As a result, investment decision 
processes are improved (Vijh, 2002; Hulbert et al., 2002). While this enhances the transparency and 
monitoring of the ICM, the parent’s business scope is essentially unaffected, and this differentiates an 
ECO from a spin-off or a sell-off. The internal and external governance structures of both the parent 
and the offspring (such as board size and independence, institutional ownership, and level of analyst 
following), are expected to change because of the ECO. The potential decrease in information 
asymmetry and improvement in management incentive plans can enhance the quality of corporate 
governance of both the parent and offspring, thereby driving the observed improvement in the efficiency 
of the parent’s ICM. Such improvement in corporate governance mechanisms is evidence that the 
expected divestment gains are likely to be the true motive for the ECO.  
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The discussion presented in this section motivates the following hypotheses that we test in this 
study: 
H1: The allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM improves significantly following an ECO. 
H2: The improvement in allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM is driven by improvements in 
the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms of the parent following the ECO.3 
3. Sample, methodology and explanatory variables 
3.1. Sample 
To investigate the impact of ECOs on allocative efficiency and firm valuation we construct two 
different samples of companies based on US data: a sample of companies that carve out divisions and 
a sample of companies that do not perform any divestment activity over the entire sample period from 
1980 to 2013. We obtain the sample of ECOs from the SDC Global New Issues Database and our initial 
sample consists of 1,328 parent firms that complete ECOs during the sample period. Following the 
sample construction methodology in CW, we exclude companies that operate in financial services 
industries with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999, which reduces 
the sample of ECOs to 889. We exclude parent companies for which company- and segment-level data 
are not available. Specifically, since we track each ECO over a 7-year period (i.e. from three years 
before to three years after the transaction year), we exclude companies that do not have relevant 
financial information over this period surrounding each ECO. Our final sample consists of 354 ECOs. 
We obtain our sample of control companies from the most recent Compustat business 
information file. We exclude the firm-year observations that lack any of the financial information 
necessary to perform the matching procedures. We also remove from the control group companies with 
a changing number of segments during the sample period as this suggests some restructuring. Finally, 
we require that each control firm has more than one business segment, i.e. it is a diversified firm. These 
                                                          
3 While we have argued above that improvement in the corporate governance of the offspring contributes to 
increasing the parent ICM efficiency, this contribution is indirect, and this paper focuses on the direct impact of 
improvement in parent governance on its own ICM efficiency  
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criteria result in a final sample of 3,695 control firms. From this control sample we identify a matching 
firm that did not perform an ECO but has characteristics similar to its ECO performing counterpart. To 
this end we use the Abadie and Imbens (2006) procedure and a probit model of the likelihood of 
performing an ECO. Table 1 provides detailed definitions of the variables used in this study.  
 [Please Insert Table 1 about Here] 
3.2. Measuring allocative efficiency of ICM before and after ECO 
We adopt two direct measures of allocative efficiency, namely, the relative investment ratio 
(RINV) and relative value added (RVA) (Rajan et al., 2000; and Çolak and Whited, 2007). We also 
employ an indirect measure of allocative efficiency, namely, EXVAL (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Çolak and 
Whited, 2007). These correlation-based measures aim to capture the association between the level of 
investment and the investment opportunities across segments. The parent’s investment programme is 
considered the more efficient, the greater the investment in the segments with the highest growth 
potential and investment opportunities. RINV measures the relative investment intensity in high growth 
versus low growth segments. RVA captures the sensitivity of industry-adjusted investment of a parent 
segment to the industry median q ratio that is measured using the pure-play companies which operate 
in the given segment’s industry. The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus 
book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus deferred taxes. The denominator of q equals the 
book value of assets. EXVAL captures the value of a conglomerate relative to a collection of single-
segment companies in the industries corresponding to the conglomerate’s segments. Appendix A1 
describes the formulae used for calculating RINV, RVA and EXVAL.  
3.3. Treatment effects estimator 
Our methodology accounts for the possible endogeneity that can arise when analysing the 
change in allocative efficiency of firms that decide to perform an ECO. In an observational sample such 
as ours, the assignment of firms to the ECO group (the treatment group) and to the non-ECO group (the 
non-treatment group) is not random and could be self-selected. This means that the treatment effect, i.e. 
the improvement in allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM, could be due to the characteristics of the 
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self-selecting firms rather than to the treatment per se. If the decision to carve out business operations 
is thus endogenous, companies that opt for it would have systematically different characteristics from 
those that decide not to. If the allocative efficiency of companies does improve following ECOs, and 
this improvement is attributable to the ECO event, then this treatment effect must be observable after 
controlling for such systematic differences. The average treatment effect is statistically estimated by 
building a control sample of companies displaying the same characteristics and thus the same propensity 
as the treated sample and then averaging the difference in allocative efficiency metrics between the 
treatment and matched control samples.  
We use the matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (AI) (2006). This sample 
matching technique provides an adjustment for the asymptotic bias present in simple matching 
estimators such as the PSM estimator. Appendix A2 provides a discussion of the methodology for 
obtaining treatment effect estimates based on the AI procedure. A detailed description of the 
implementation of the AI estimation procedure with the Stata software is provided by Abadie, Drukker, 
Herr and Imbens (2004). All matching results are based on one nearest neighbour, i.e. one with 
propensity closest to a treated observation, selected from the control group. In unreported results we 
also perform matching based on more than one nearest neighbour control firms and our conclusions 
remain unchanged. 
Next, we estimate the treatment effects on each of our performance variables, i.e. the control 
sample-adjusted results. We firstly estimate level treatment effects as the average post-ECO level of 
each of the three variables relative to the level in the control sample. We calculate the average values 
of RINV, RVA and EXVAL before and after each ECO. Specifically, we define the variable Before as 
the average for each conglomerate company over a period t-2 to t-1 (t-3 to t-1) relative to the ECO year. 
For Before, we do not report level treatment effects.4  The variable After is the average for each 
conglomerate company over a period t+1 to t+2 (t+1 to t+3) around the ECO year, relative to the average 
                                                          
4 In the level treatment effects, it is invalid to adopt the level of RINV, RVA and EXVAL as controls. This is because 
these variables would be self-explained (Çolak and Whited, 2007).  
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of a matched sample of diversified firms using the AI method. Following CW, we define the variable 
Change as the difference between the variables After and Before.  
The Difference in Difference (DinD) treatment effects captures the average change in the 
performance variables relative to the average change in the control sample. Using RINV as an example, 
the variable DinD is defined as: 
∆ RINVECO Parent  – ∆ RINVControl Company                     (1) 
It should be noted that the DinD variable accounts for unobservable time-invariant control 
factors, whereas the level treatment-effect estimator does not. When the variables Change or DinD are 
significantly greater than zero, we interpret this result as an indication that the given improvement in 
allocative efficiency and valuation is driven by the ECO per se and not by the inherent characteristics 
of the ECO parents. 
The AI matching procedure requires the development of a probability model that estimates the 
likelihood of embarking on an ECO. The probit regression that we estimate is of the form: 
Probit (ECO) =  α + βnControls + εn                                                                            (2) 
where the ‘predictor’ variables are as defined in Table 1. To estimate the regression, we use two sub-
samples of firms: a treatment sample of companies that perform ECOs and a control sample of 
companies that did not engage in any divestment activity. The dependent variable assumes a value of 
one if the firm has carried out an ECO and zero otherwise. 
As alternative tests, we employ two other familiar estimators, namely, the PSM estimator 
developed in Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and the Heckman (1979) procedure to correct for self-
selection. 5 According to CW, the AI technique is arguably superior to other matching methods such as 
the Dehejia and Wahba (2002) PSM and the Heckman bias adjustment methods since it does not involve 
any parametric assumptions regarding the distributions of the variables. Relaxing such assumptions is 
particularly important when using data from Compustat, as these distributional assumptions are likely 
                                                          
5 Villalonga (2004) applies PSM methodology to the study of conglomerate discount. 
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to be untenable and could result in biased standard errors. In addition, the distribution of many income 
and balance-sheet statement items may not be accurately captured by the logistic or normal distributions 
and these are the two distributions assumed by the PSM and the Heckman bias adjustment methods. 
The PSM and Heckman methods employ the same first stage probit model as the AI procedure 
above. For the PSM, as with the AI approach, all matching results are based on one nearest neighbour 
selected from the control group. In unreported results we also perform matching based on more than 
one nearest neighbour control firms and our conclusions remain unchanged. In the Heckman (1979) 
model, we estimate the average allocative efficiency before and after an ECO by running the following 
(Heckman) regression:  
∆ 𝑆𝑛(𝑇𝑛)= α + β1T𝑛 + β2InvMills + εn                                                                                       (3) 
where α  represents the average change in allocative efficiency in the sample of non-restructuring 
companies and the sum of (α+β
1
) captures the average change in allocative efficiency in the ECO 
sample. ∆S is defined as the change in allocative efficiency and conglomerate valuation and T𝑛  is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the company performs a carve-out and zero otherwise. β
2
 is 
defined as the coefficient of the variable used to adjust for self-selection bias in the Heckman regression. 
If the firm has self-selected to perform the restructuring and the decision thus is endogenous, εi is 
correlated with ∆S and the estimate of β
1
 will be biased. According to Heckman (1979), the issue of 
having a biased estimate is analogous to an omitted variable problem where the omitted variable is the 
inverse Mills Ratio (InvMills) that corresponds to the likelihood of performing ECO. To obtain a 
consistent estimate of β
1
, we first need to estimate the InvMills with a probit model. We then include 
the estimated InvMills in Eq. (3). To present the results from the analysis based on the Heckman bias 
correction procedure, we define the variable Heckman Treated as the sum of (α+β
1
) in Eq. (3). We also 
define the variable Heckman Controls as the coefficient corresponding to α in Eq. (3). Finally, we note 
that all tests in this study are performed with winsorised variables at the 1st and 99th percentile of the 
sample. 
3.4. Modelling the impact of governance changes on allocative efficiency 
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To examine whether enhanced corporate governance of the parent and offspring post-ECO is associated 
with greater allocative efficiency, we match the offspring and its parent firm with the BoardEx and 
Execucomp databases. We replace any missing information from BoardEx and Execucomp by 
searching the Proxy Statements, 10K and Prospectuses filed by the parent and offspring firms. Internal 
corporate governance characteristics are measured by board duality i.e. non-separation of the board 
chairman and CEO roles, board size, board composition, CEO compensation structure and CEO tenure. 
External governance characteristics are measured by analyst coverage, analyst’s forecast accuracy, the 
number of institutional investors on the share register of the given company and the concentration of 
their ownership. Detailed definitions of the corporate governance characteristics examined in this study 
are provided in Table 1. We follow the methodologies in Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), Coles, 
McWilliams and Sen (2001) when constructing the internal and external governance characteristics. 
Data on analyst coverage and analyst forecast dispersion are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (IBES) database. We regress the changes in our allocative efficiency measures on the 
changes in corporate governance characteristics to assess the impact of governance changes on 
allocative efficiency.  
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Sample descriptive statistics  
Table 2 Panel A presents the distribution of our ECO sample over time. The smallest proportion of 
ECOs in our sample was announced in the 1980s. The proportions of ECOs announced in the 1990s 
and 2000s are very similar, with 42% of our ECO sample announced in the former and 39% announced 
in the latter period.  
[Please Insert Table 2 about Here] 
Table 2 Panel B shows some of the key financial characteristics of companies that embark on 
ECOs and the control sample of multi-segment companies that do not perform any restructuring activity 
(non-ECO). The table demonstrates several interesting differences between the two sub-samples. First, 
ECO parents appear to have significantly better investment opportunities than the control firms (median 
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MTBV of 1.65 vs 1.38 respectively). Second, ECO parents have significantly higher EBITDA/Sales 
margins (median values of 0.14 vs 0.10 for the control sample). Third, ECO parents are considerably 
and significantly more leveraged (with a median Debt/Assets of 0.27 vs 0.18 for control firms), and 
therefore, under greater financial constraints. In addition, the ECO firms comprise significantly more 
segments (degree of diversification) than the control sample (median Number of segments of 4.00 vs 
2.00 for the non-ECO firms). The significant difference in Relative entropy further confirms that ECO 
parents are more diversified. ECO parents face significantly greater Financing gap than non-ECO firms. 
The other significant differences are in IPO Activity, Market share and Largest segment profit.  
Based on this initial univariate analysis, it is apparent that the ECO parents are more diverse 
and complex and, as a result, more vulnerable to dysfunctional ICMs. Additionally, these findings show 
that ECO parents differ systematically from the control sample. This suggests that any estimate of 
improvement in allocative efficiency of the ECO parents’ ICMs could be subject to a potential 
endogeneity bias, i.e. these systematic differences between ECO and non-ECO firms could be the true 
cause of increase in allocative efficiency and not the ECO event per se.6  
Table 2 Panel C provides more transactional data on the ECO parents and their offspring units. 
The median offspring is about one twentieth of the median parent and the ECO raises nearly $97m 
(median Total proceeds). The parent retains a median 72% of equity in the newly listed segment. The 
median of Total proceeds is around 30% ($97m over $311m) of the median ECO market value, which 
is consistent with the Equity retained statistics. Of the 354 ECOs, 155 are in the same SIC3 industry as 
the parent, while 84 are in the same 2-digit (SIC2) industry but in different 3-digit SIC (SIC3) industries. 
Thus, 68% of the offspring retain very strong/strong product market, technology, input or marketing 
links with their parents.  
4.2. Probit model of the ECO decision 
                                                          
6 Such improvement is reported in previous studies that examine the effect of refocusing through spin-offs 
(Gertner et al., 2002; Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004) but they ignore the endogeneity. 
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To perform the AI matching procedure, we first estimate a probit regression of the likelihood of 
performing an ECO by including covariates that have been identified as relevant by previous studies 
(see Table 1) and included in Table 2. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 and described 
in detail. Our analysis demonstrates, consistent with the univariate results in Table 2, that companies 
that perform ECOs have systematically different characteristics from companies that do not embark on 
restructuring. These differences, potentially accounting for some of the observed treatment effects, 
highlight the need to address the problem of endogeneity when assessing the change in allocative 
efficiency.  
[Please Insert Table 3 about Here] 
We find that ECO parents are significantly larger and more diversified. Specifically, for one-
unit increase in the Relative entropy of the parent firm, the likelihood of performing an ECO increases 
by 0.1%. They also have higher valuation or growth opportunities, carry more debt, and perform ECOs 
in favourable market conditions with high IPO activity. Of these, the IPO market environment has the 
strongest marginal impact, suggesting that parent firms exploit the market opportunity to time their 
ECOs. In particular, for 1% increase in IPO activity, the likelihood of ECO increases by 5.9%. We note 
that the IPO activity and M&A activity are exogenous to the change in parent allocative efficiency and 
valuation following ECO. While being associated with the ECO decision, they are unlikely to be 
significantly related to any subsequent change in the parent’s allocative efficiency.  
In terms of the economic significance of other factors, we find that for 1% increase in the 
Debt/Asset ratio, the likelihood ECO increases by 0.3%; for 1% increase in the Log sales of the parent 
firm, the likelihood of ECO increases by 0.1%; and for 1% increase in the Largest segment profit, the 
likelihood of ECO decreases by 0.3%. Additionally, parent firms that enjoy relatively higher Industry 
sales growth, higher Market share and a more favourable profit performance of their largest segments 
(Largest segment profit) are associated with significantly lower likelihood of undertaking an ECO. 
Under these favourable conditions, parents have less incentive to restructure through an ECO. For 
example, for 1% increase in Industry sales growth, the likelihood of ECO decreases by 0.7%. 
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Based on the above probit, we employ the AI matching procedure to identify an appropriate 
control (non-ECO) firm for each ECO parent in our sample. To evaluate the accuracy of our matching 
procedure, we compare our ECO sample to the 354 control firms identified by the AI method. The mean 
and median comparison tests between the two groups in terms of the significant firm-specific predictor 
variables in the probit model (Log sales, MTBV, Debt/Assets, Relative entropy, Market share, and 
Largest segment profit) show no statistically significant differences between our ECO parent sample 
and the matched control firms. These unreported findings suggest that the selected control firms are 
very similar to the ECO parents in all important aspects, including their propensity to undertake ECO, 
but only the ECO parents carry out the restructuring. Two other variables significant in the probit model, 
IPO activity and Industry sales growth, are stock market- and industry- related rather than firm-specific 
and hence excluded from this comparison. 
4.3. Treatment effects results 
We proceed with the evaluation of the average treatment effect of ECOs on the allocative efficiency 
and valuation of the parents. The results from the analysis are presented in Table 4, Panels A and B for 
the analysis of change in allocative efficiency and valuation over periods respectively of (-2, +2) years 
and (-3, +3) years centred on the year of the ECO completion, t = 0. As defined in the methodology 
section, Before is the average for each conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years 
before and ending one year before the completion of the ECO i.e. the average of t-2 and t-1 (t-3 to t-1) 
values. The variable After is the average for each conglomerate company over a period starting one year 
after and ending two (or three) years after the completion of the ECO, relative to the average of the 
matched sample. Change is the difference between Before and After. 
 [Please Insert Table 4 about Here] 
We find that the average values of RINV and RVA before the performance of ECOs are negative 
but not significantly different from zero, i.e. companies that perform ECOs do not appear to be 
characterised by significant levels of investment inefficiency before the completion of the event. 
However, to gain a better understanding of whether investment inefficiency existed before the ECOs, 
we also need to examine whether the allocative efficiency improves following the ECO, after addressing 
19 
 
any possible endogeneity bias. The analysis presented in Table 4, Panels A and B, demonstrates that 
the allocative efficiency of the parent is improved significantly during the first three years following an 
ECO. In particular, the Change coefficients for RINV (+0.02) and RVA (+0.01) measured over the 
window (-2, +2) years are statistically significant. Furthermore, DinD coefficients are positive (+0.01) 
over the (-2, +2) years event window and statistically significant (at the 10% level significance).  
Table 4, Panels A and B indicate that there is also significant improvement in the parent’s 
EXVAL. Specifically, this finding is supported by the positive and strongly significant Change 
coefficient (+0.57) over the (-2, +2) years event window, and DinD coefficient (+0.53) over the (-3, +3) 
years event window. These results provide support to our hypothesis H1 of a significant increase in the 
allocative efficiency of parent firms following ECOs. The fact that parents are better able to allocate 
capital across different business segments following ECOs suggests that these pre-restructuring parents 
were suffering from inefficiency of their ICMs. 
In Table 5 we repeat the analysis of the impact of ECO on conglomerate allocative efficiency 
and valuation with the use of the Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) PSM technique in Panel A and the 
Heckman (1979) bias adjustment procedure in Panel B. We find consistent results. Our analysis shows 
that the Change coefficients of RINV and RVA are positive and statistically highly significant when 
using the PSM technique over the two- and three-year event window following ECO. We also find that 
the coefficient corresponding to the DinD variable is positive and significant over the (-3, +3) years 
event window and across the three measures of allocative efficiency when using this technique. The 
DinD variable for EXVAL is also significant over the (-2, +2) years window albeit at a lower level of 
significance at 10%.  
[Please Insert Table 5 about Here] 
We note that all coefficients associated with the variable InvMills presented in Table 5 are 
positive and significant. This finding highlights the importance of correcting for the self-selection bias. 
In other words, the characteristics that lead companies to choose ECOs as a refocusing mechanism are 
likely on average to impact positively their allocative efficiency. Crucially, we also find that most of 
the Heckman treatment estimates (i.e. the coefficients corresponding to the variable Heckman_Treated) 
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are positive and statistically significant in Table 5. These results demonstrate that there is a significant 
enhancement in the allocative efficiency of parent companies following ECOs and that this 
enhancement is due to the impact of the ECO event itself and not just due to the characteristics of the 
parent firms. 
It is important to point out that the AI procedure shows that our analysis is unlikely to suffer 
from any asymptotic bias as the values of the DinD Treatment Effects coefficients with the bias 
adjustment are almost identical to the DinD Treatment Effects coefficients without the bias adjustment.7 
This result suggests that our analysis based on the PSM in Table 5, Panel A is as reliable as the AI result 
in Table 4. Since the PSM result is stronger, in terms of statistical significance, and it is not tainted by 
any unadjusted asymptotic bias, it lends even stronger support for our hypothesis of allocative efficiency 
improvement following ECOs. Our Heckman result in Table 5, Panel B is also stronger than the result 
based on the AI technique. Overall, although the methodologically superior AI matching procedure 
generates a weaker result, it does not detract from the reliability of the analysis based on the PSM and 
Heckman methods.  
4.4. Analysis of corporate governance characteristics 
Our hypothesis H2 is that the functioning of the parent company’s ICM is improved following 
an ECO owing to better corporate governance in the parent and offspring companies triggered by that 
event. To test the validity of this proposition, we examine the change in key internal governance 
characteristics such as board duality, board size, board composition, and CEO compensation structure. 
We also investigate the change in key external governance characteristics such as analyst coverage, 
analyst forecast accuracy and stock ownership of institutional investors in our sample of ECOs. The 
variable Before is the average of the given governance variable for each conglomerate company over a 
period t-2 to t-1 (t-3 to t-1) relative to the ECO year. Similarly, After is the average of the given 
                                                          
7 In the analysis presented in Table 4 we only report the bias-adjusted DinD Treatment Effects values since these 
are almost identical to the non-bias-adjusted values. 
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governance variable for each conglomerate company over a period t+1 to t+2 (t+1 to t+3) relative to 
the ECO year. The variable Change is defined as the difference between Before and After. 
Table 6, Panels A and B investigate the changes in the governance structure of parent firms 
over periods of respectively (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years centred on the year of the ECO completion, t = 
0. The results show that the ratio of non-executive to executive board members increases after the ECO 
over each of the two event windows that we consider. Specifically, we observe a positive and 
statistically significant change in the variable Board indep. amounting to +0.59 and +0.72 during the (-
2, +2) and (-3, +3) years event windows respectively. At the same time, we find that Board size 
decreases significantly by 0.40 and 0.46 during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years event windows 
respectively following the ECO. These results suggest an improvement in the governance structure of 
the parent, as smaller board size could imply a better coordination among directors (Yermack, 1996) 
and more independent directors can lead to improved control, monitoring, and strategic leadership of 
the board (Gilson et al., 2001). Furthermore, we find that the Analyst Coverage increases significantly 
by 5.4 and 6.1 more analysts during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years event windows respectively following 
the ECO. These results indicate that the parent management is subject to increased internal independent 
monitoring and more rigorous capital market scrutiny following the ECO. These improvements in 
governance are likely to lead to reduced levels of asymmetric information between company insiders 
and company outsiders. In the (-2, +2) years window, we also observe an increase in the average 
analyst’s forecast standard error, but the significance and magnitude of the coefficient decrease in the 
(-3, 3) years window, suggesting a decline in the information asymmetry of parent firms as observed 
by analysts. 
[Please Insert Table 6 about Here] 
We observe no change in the average CEO’s cash compensation during the (-2, +2) years but 
identify a significant increase over the (-3, +3) years window amounting to $208,314. We also observe 
a significant increase in the CEO’s non-cash based compensation during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) year 
windows. The latter increase in the CEO’s compensation package also accounts for the largest 
proportion of increase in the total average CEO compensation in the parent firm. Specifically, our 
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analysis demonstrates that the CEO’s non-cash based compensation increases on average by US $1.22 
million and US $ 1. 39 million over (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years respectively. This is interesting, given 
that the parent company is likely to be a more focused business following the ECO. As a result, we 
expect that the CEO’s financing and investment decisions are more likely to have a direct impact on the 
parent company’s share price, and these actions will have a more direct impact on the CEO’s non-cash 
based compensation. It appears that the increase in non-cash based compensation associated with the 
ECO leads to a better alignment between the interests of managers and interests of shareholders. This 
better alignment of interests could arguably improve the allocative efficiency of the parent firm, thereby 
satisfying one of the key objectives of the ECO, which is to better align managerial and shareholder 
interests than in the more diversified parent. This link is investigated further below.  
In sum, the analyses presented in this section provide supporting evidence that there are some 
considerable improvements in the internal and external governance characteristics, including a better 
calibrated CEO incentive pay, of parent firms following ECOs.  
Table 7, Panels A and B present the analysis of the change in corporate governance 
characteristics in the offspring firm in the first two- and three-year periods following ECO completion 
respectively8, bearing in mind that it was only possible for us to obtain observations for offspring firms 
after the ECO event. In this case, the variable Before is the value of the given governance characteristic 
for each offspring at t = 0. After is value of the governance variable for each offspring as of t+2 (t+3) 
relative to the ECO year. The variable Change is defined as the difference between Before and After. 
[Please Insert Table 7 about Here] 
The results show that, in the offspring, Board size as well as the ratio of non-executive directors 
to executive directors (Board indep.) tend to increase following ECO. Specifically, we observe a 
statistically significant increase of 0.65 and 0.22 in Board size and Board indep. respectively over the 
                                                          
8 We note that the data availability for different governance characteristics varies considerably. Each governance 
characteristic is tested on the basis of the number of observations for which we have available data. For example, 
in Table 7, Panel A, data for analyst coverage are available for 206 offspring companies while data for the number 
of institutional investors is available for only 81 offspring companies. This large sampling variation needs to be 
kept in mind in assessing the significance of the offspring-related improvements.  
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(0, +2) year period following ECO. Board size also increases significantly over the period of (0, +3) 
years. These results suggest that as the carved-out units, newly-established entities, tend to expand their 
sales and market share, they are also likely to recruit more directorial talent and increase their board 
size. Additionally, the increase in the proportion of independent directors suggests that the offspring 
companies tend to adopt a more independent board structure that is likely to lead to greater governance 
effectiveness by strengthening oversight and reducing conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders.  
Our analysis also shows that there is an increase in the number of institutional investors and 
the degree of analyst coverage over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) years windows following the ECO. 
Specifically, we observe a positive and statistically significant increase amounting to 0.56 and 0.45 in 
the number of institutional investors (Number of instit. investors) over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) years 
windows following the ECO at t = 0 respectively. The Analyst coverage of the offspring also increases 
by 2.5 and 2.8 analysts over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) years windows after the ECO respectively. These 
results demonstrate that the offspring companies are subject to strong capital market scrutiny that 
increases over time, thereby enhancing the external governance of the offspring. While the average 
CEO’s compensation falls together with its equity and cash components over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) 
years windows after the ECO, this decrease is not significant. The CEO’s tenure increases significantly 
by about 1.7 and 2.2 years on average over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) years windows following the ECO, 
perhaps to provide a stable leadership to the infant firms. This argument receives some support from 
the significant increase in the cases of overlap of the CEO and chairperson roles in these firms in the 
over the (0, +3) event window after the ECO. As a result, there appears to be a trade-off between 
leadership demands and rigorous governance. The internal and external governance improvements in 
the offspring firms, in conjunction with similar improvements in the parents, are consistent with such 
anticipated improvements acting as major motivators for the ECO decision. We next model the impact 
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of these changes in governance characteristics of parents on their allocative efficiency metrics in a 
multivariate framework.9 
4.5. Effect of corporate governance changes on the functioning of the parent’s ICM 
We perform a regression analysis of the determinants of the change in allocative efficiency and 
valuation of the parents following the ECO. The results are presented in Table 8, Panels A and B over 
the windows (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years respectively centred on the year of ECO completion. For each 
parent company the change in allocative efficiency or valuation is adjusted for the corresponding change 
in the matched control firm, where each control firm is identified using the AI matching estimator. We 
note that this analysis excludes any additional control variables such as parent company firm and 
industry characteristics since these variables are already accounted for in the AI matching procedure 
that is based on the set of significant predictor variables in our probit model (see Table 3). For the 
purposes of the regression analysis we measure the change in governance characteristics over a (-1, +1) 
years window. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. 
[Please Insert Table 8 about Here] 
Overall, the results presented in Table 8 support our hypothesis H2 that the observed increase 
in allocative efficiency following ECOs is driven by improvements in the governance characteristics of 
parent firms. Specifically, over the event window (-2, +2) years our analysis suggests that one of the 
factors that contributes to enhanced allocative efficiency following the ECO is the increased capital 
market scrutiny to which the parent firm is subjected. This conjecture is supported by the positive and 
statistically significant relation between the increase in the number of analysts following parent firms 
(∆ Analyst coverage) as well as the increase in the stock ownership of institutional investors (∆ Shares 
of instit. investors) and improvements in ∆ RINV following ECOs. In addition, we find that 
improvements in the internal governance characteristics of parent firms, such as the increase in the ratio 
of non-executive to executive directors (∆ Board indep.) and the decrease in the number of board 
                                                          
9 We do not model the direct impact of improvements in the offspring on the allocative efficiency of their parents 
measured over windows starting before the ECO event and model only the impact of improvements in the parents. 
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members (∆ Board size) are positively and significantly related to changes in ∆ RVA. Our results also 
demonstrate that higher non-cash based CEO compensation is likely to lead to a better alignment 
between the interests of managers and the interests of shareholders, thus leading to an improvement in 
the allocative efficiency of the parent firm. Specifically, we find that the variable ∆ CEO non-cash 
comp. is positively and significantly related to ∆ RVA while the variable ∆ CEO cash comp. has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on ∆ RVA. ECOs appear to bring about significant changes 
in internal and external corporate governance structures as well as in the CEO incentive structure, 
resulting in stronger monitoring of the investment decisions of the parents and enhanced allocative 
efficiency.10 We also find that enlarging the board significantly (∆ Board size) reduces the ∆ EXVAL 
variable and, as a result, causes value losses to shareholders. 
These findings are robust, and indeed stronger, when we consider the longer (-3, +3) years 
window around the ECO completion. We find that higher values of the variables ∆ Analyst coverage 
and ∆ Board indep. are positively and significantly associated with changes in ∆ RINV and ∆ RVA. We 
also find that higher values of ∆ CEO non-cash comp. are positively related to changes in all three 
measures of the parent’s allocative efficiency. While larger boards (∆ Board size) are significantly 
associated with declines in ∆ RVA, higher institutional ownership ( ∆  Shares of instit. investors) 
enhances ∆ RINV. The valuation of the ECO parent (∆ EXVAL) is significantly enhanced by higher 
numbers of analysts following the parent (∆ Analyst coverage), by higher proportion of shares owned 
by institutional investors (∆ Shares of instit. investors), and by higher non-cash CEO compensation (∆ 
CEO non-cash comp.) but reduced by larger boards (∆ Board size) and the combining of the roles of 
CEO and chairperson (Board duality). In unreported results we repeat the analysis presented in Table 8 
Panels A and B above using the change in governance characteristics over a (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years 
window respectively and our results remain qualitatively similar.  
                                                          
10 In additional unreported robustness tests we replicate the regression analysis presented in Section 4.5 with the 
inclusion of the control variables which relate to the financial and industry-level characteristics of the parent firms 
before the carve-out and find that our results remain unchanged. We also test the robustness of our results to the 
use of alternative measures of the presence of institutional investors in the parent firm’s shareholder base. 
Specifically, we repeat the analysis presented in Table 8 using the variable Number of instit. Investors instead of 
Share of instit. Investors and confirm that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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To confirm that our results are not driven by the specific pre-event financial characteristics of 
ECO parents but by the ECO event itself, we perform additional regression analysis of the relation 
between the change in allocative efficiency and the change in corporate governance characteristics of 
the parent firms. The aim of this analysis is to determine whether the improvement in allocative 
efficiency is driven by increases in the internal and external corporate governance quality of the parent 
sample that are higher than any potential increases that could have materialised in the matched control 
sample over the same time period. In other words, we seek to establish whether the difference in 
difference change in allocative efficiency is driven by difference in difference changes in corporate 
governance characteristics. The difference in difference values are calculated as the change in the parent 
company minus the change in the matched control firm over identical time periods. For this purpose, 
we use the parent and matched control firm samples using the AI matching procedure and estimate the 
following regression model: 
DinD_treatment effects ( ∆  RINV, RVA or EXVAL) = 𝛼  + 𝛽𝑖 DinD_treatment ( ∆  corporate 
governance characteristics) + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                            (4) 
Table 9 shows the results from this analysis. We note that there was insufficient information 
for some of the companies in the matched control sample and, as a result, we could not include all 
measures of internal and external corporate governance quality measures in our regression model. 
Specifically, we had to exclude the following variables: ∆ Shares of instit. Investors, ∆ CEO tenure, and 
∆ Analyst forecast error. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 9 confirm the robustness of our findings in the earlier 
analysis and show that the improvements in corporate governance characteristics are significantly 
related to increased allocative efficiency and enhanced valuation following the ECO. In particular, our 
analysis shows that greater board independence (DinD_∆ Board indep.), separation of the roles of CEO 
and chairperson (DinD_Board Duality) as well as higher non-cash CEO compensation (DinD_∆ CEO non-
cash comp.) all significantly improve DinD ∆ RVA measured over the window of (-2, +2) years. In 
addition, higher analyst coverage (DinD_∆ Analyst coverage), smaller board size (DinD_∆ Board size) and 
higher non-cash CEO compensation (DinD_∆ CEO non-cash comp.) significantly improve DinD ∆ RINV 
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over the same event window. Similarly, higher analyst coverage (DinD_∆ Analyst coverage), smaller 
board size (DinD_∆ Board size), non-duality of the roles of CEO and chairperson (DinD_Board Duality) 
as well as higher non-cash CEO compensation (DinD_∆ CEO non-cash comp.) enhance DinD ∆ EXVAL. 
[Please Insert Table 9 about Here] 
Over the longer event window, (-3, +3) years , we find that greater board independence (DinD_∆ 
Board indep.), smaller board size (DinD_∆ Board size), separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson 
(DinD_Board Duality) as well as higher non-cash CEO compensation (DinD_∆ CEO non-cash comp.) are 
all significantly related to ∆ RVA and ∆ EXVAL. Additionally, increased analyst coverage (DinD ∆ 
Analyst coverage) significantly improves EXVAL. Increased board independence (DinD ∆  Board 
indep.) also significantly improves RINV.   Our hypothesis H2 of a positive impact of governance 
changes following ECOs on the allocative efficiency and valuation of the parent firms is thus strongly 
supported. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Prior studies such as Gertner et al. (2002), Ahn and Denis (2004), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003), Burch 
and Nanda (2003), and Çolak and Whited (2007) investigate the impact of spin-offs and sell-offs on the 
functioning of the internal capital market (ICM) of the parent company. Our study contributes to the 
literature by considering an alternative mechanism of restructuring, namely equity carve-out (ECO). 
We adopt the methodology in Çolak and Whited (2007) and account for the endogeneity of the ECO 
decision by evaluating the change in the allocative efficiency of the internal capital market relative to 
the change in such efficiency which occurs in a group of control companies with similar characteristics 
and propensity to undertake an ECO. Specifically, we account for the degree of diversification (Relative 
entropy), size (Log sales), liquidity (Financing gap), leverage (Debt/Assets), industry M&A and IPO 
activity as well as Industry sales growth. Importantly, our analysis shows that ECOs have a positive 
impact on the allocative efficiency of parent companies that undertake them.  
By accounting for the problem of endogeneity we demonstrate that the relative value added and 
relative investment ratio are significantly enhanced following ECOs and that these results are not driven 
28 
 
by any inherent characteristics associated with companies that choose to perform ECOs, but by the ECO 
event itself. Importantly, we also demonstrate that the improvement in allocative efficiency of parent 
firms is linked to increased capital market scrutiny and board independence as well as reduced board 
size in these companies following ECOs. Our analysis shows that the enhanced allocative efficiency is 
further related to the fact that the CEOs of the parent firms have stronger incentives to act in the best 
interest of shareholders since their remuneration contracts are geared more towards non-cash based 
compensation following ECOs. These findings contribute to the extant literature on restructuring by 
showing that the functioning of the ICM can be enhanced by augmenting the level of monitoring from 
company outsiders as well as the internal governance mechanisms of the business rather than by merely 
reducing its size or industry diversity.  
Our results contrast with the lack of impact of spin-offs and sell-offs in improving the allocative 
efficiency of conglomerate parents, reported by Çolak and Whited (2007) and confirmed by our own 
unreported results.11 Our analysis carries important implications for the corporate managers who seek 
to improve the allocative efficiency of their companies by demonstrating that carve-outs could be a 
more effective mechanism to restructure company operations than spin-offs and sell-offs. The reasons 
for this differential impact on allocative efficiency of alternative re-focusing strategies merit future 
research. Since equity carve-out can be considered an interim corporate stage that tends to be followed 
by secondary events including full spin-off, sell-off and re-acquisition (Klein et al., 1991; Perotti and 
Rosetto, 2007), a potential avenue for future research is to investigate the relation between the allocative 
efficiency and such secondary events.  
                                                          
11 In unreported results we examine the change in allocative efficiency surrounding spin-offs and sell-offs using 
the same performance metrics as in our current paper. We find evidence that the ICM of the parent does not change 
over the two-year period following spin-offs and sell-offs. We find some evidence of deterioration in the allocative 
efficiency of parents during the three-year period following sell-offs but not following spin-offs. We also repeat 
the analysis using the PSM matching procedure and the Heckman bias adjustment procedure and find no evidence 
of significant change in allocative efficiency once endogeneity and sample selection biases are allowed for. This 
lack of impact is consistent with the evidence reported by Çolak and Whited (2007). These results are available 
from the authors. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable name Description and source of data 
Expected 
relation to 
likelihood of 
ECO  
Equity carve-out (ECO) Dummy variable that is equal to one if the company performs a carve-out and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC) N/A 
Assets Total assets of the conglomerate company.* (Source: Compustat) N/A 
Investment 
Measures the capital expenditures of the conglomerate divided by the total sales in the year prior to carve-out completion.* 
(Source: Compustat) 
N/A 
Number of segments Number of segments of the conglomerate company.* (Source: Compustat)  
q 
The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus 
deferred taxes.* The denominator of q equals the book value of assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
 
Relative entropy 
For a firm operating in n industry segments, this takes into consideration (i) number of segments in which it operates, and (ii) 
relative importance of each segment in total sales. If Pi is the share of the ith segment in total sales, then DT = ∑ [Pi*ln (
1
Pi
)]Ni=1  
(Palepu, 1985; Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).* 
(Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Debt/Assets 
A positive proxy for scope and incentive to expropriate debt holders and benefit stock holders. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; 
Parrino, 1997). Debt = long-term debt/ net assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Log sales (Size) 
Parent size proxy and measure of likelihood of ECO (Haynes, Thompson, and Wright, 2003). Measured as natural logarithm 
of Net Sales.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Market share 
 Parent sales/ 3-digit (primary SIC-code) industry sales. Parent primary SIC code defined by Compustat.* (Source: 
Compustat) 
+ 
Financing gap 
Proxy for parent’s need for cash to finance future investment activities (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). (Cash flow plus net 
debt issued minus net capital expenditure)/ Net sales.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
EBITDA/Sales A parent firm liquidity is measured as EBITDA/Net sales. (Source: Compustat) - 
Largest segment profit  
Proxy for positive demand shock (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) operating profits of firm’s largest segment/ its net sales.* 
(Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Industry sales growth 
Two-year industry sales growth measured as of year of carve-out completion, at parent’s primary two-digit industry SIC code 
level and a proxy for unanticipated shifts in industry prospects (Çolak and Whited, 2007). (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
M&A activity 
Positive proxy for liquidity of market for corporate assets (Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). Value of all mergers, 
acquisitions, and acquisitions of majority interest (as defined by the SDC Platinum Database) in parent firm’s two-digit industry 
and normalized by that industry’s market capitalization.** (Source: SDC) 
+ 
IPO activity 
Positive proxy for liquidity of market for new equity issues (Schlingeman et al., 2002). Market value of IPOs in parent firm’s 
primary two-digit SIC code industry and normalized by that industry’s market capitalization.** (Source: SDC) 
+ 
MTBV Market value of parent equity/ book value of equity as of one year before ECO completion.*  (Source: Compustat) +/- 
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RINV 
Measure of whether the parent allocates capital to relatively high-growth i.e. high q segments. Low allocative efficiency could 
motivate an ECO. (Çolak and Whited, 2007). See Appendix A1 for description and formulae used to calculate this variable. 
The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus 
deferred taxes.* The denominator of q equals the book value of assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
- 
RVA 
Measure of whether the parent’s capital allocation to a segment is correlated with the industry median q. Low allocative 
efficiency could motivate an ECO (Çolak and Whited, 2007). See Appendix A1 for description and formulae used to calculate 
this variable.* (Source: Compustat) 
- 
Excess value (EXVAL) 
Indirect proxy for allocative efficiency measured as the parent’s market value of equity to sales ratio relative 3-digit SIC 
industry median adjusted market to sales ratio of segments in which parent operates. Low allocative efficiency could motivate 
ECO. (Çolak and Whited, 2007) See Appendix A1 for description and formulae used to calculate this variable.* (Source: 
Compustat) 
- 
Board duality  
Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of firm is also chairman of the board of directors  and zero otherwise.* (Source: 
BoardEx, Edgar) 
- 
Board size  Number of board directors.* (Source: BoardEx, Edgar) - 
Board indep.  
Number of non-executive directors/number of executive directors (Non-executive directors is used in BoardEx).* (Source: 
BoardEx, Edgar) 
+ 
Number of instit. 
investors 
Number of institutional investors with a minimum of 5% ownership present on the company’s share register (The institutional 
investor information is obtained by researching proxy statements).* (Source: Edgar) 
+ 
Share of instit. 
investors 
Proportion of shares owned by institutional investors.* (Source: Edgar) 
+ 
CEO cash comp. Sum of salary and bonus (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Feldman, 2016).* (Source: BoardEx, Execucomp, Edgar) +/- 
CEO non-cash comp. 
CEO’s total compensation minus his/her cash compensation (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Feldman, 2016).* (Source: BoardEx, 
Execucomp, Edgar) 
+ 
CEO tenure Number of years since the CEO was appointed to that position.* (Source: BoardEx, Execucomp, Edgar) + 
Analyst coverage 
Analyst coverage for a given year calculated as average of the monthly number of analysts who cover the given stock. For the 
conglomerate, we combine the analyst coverage of the offspring in the post-ECO period and the analyst coverage of the parent 
(Gilson et al., 2001).* (Source: IBES) 
+ 
Analyst forecast 
dispersion 
Analyst forecast dispersion for a given year calculated as the average of the monthly standard deviation regarding the given 
stock.* (Source: IBES) 
- 
Note: * means as of the company’s fiscal year end taken from its annual financial statements; ** means as of the end of the calendar year preceding the ECO. 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics 
Panel A. Sample distribution over time. 
Notes: The sample covers ECOs completed during the period 1980 - 2013. 
Panel B. Financial characteristics of ECO parents and non-restructuring firms 
Variable name 
ECO 
Mean (A) 
Controls 
Mean (B) 
Difference A-
B 
(t-stat) 
ECO 
Median 
Controls 
Median 
Difference A-B 
(Pearson chi2) 
Assets 34,662 33,077 
1,585*** 
(11.821) 
3,786 5,613 
-1,827 
(1.232) 
Investment 0.078 0.057 
0.021*** 
(3.730) 
0.057 0.045 
0.012 
(1.491) 
Number of segments 4.09 2.63 
1.46*** 
(2.833) 
4.00 2.00 
2.00** 
(2.362) 
Log sales 8.077 5.056 
3.021*** 
(21.672) 
7.275 5.084 
2.191*** 
(149.3) 
MTBV 2.113 2.074 
0.039**  
(2.023) 
1.646 1.380 
0.266*** 
(18.609) 
Debt/Assets 0.287 0.205 
0.082*** 
(10.058) 
0.271 0.182 
0.089*** 
(94.210) 
EBITDA/Sales 0.156 0.092 
0.064*** 
(6.473) 
0.142 0.101 
0.041*** 
(21.840) 
Relative entropy 0.930 0.598 
0.332***  
(11.305) 
0.970 0.622 
0.348*** 
(49.984) 
RVA -0.001 -0.022 
0.021**  
(1.650) 
-0.0003 -0.0002 
-0.0001*** 
(18.724) 
RINV -0.0004 -0.006 
0.006**  
(2.228) 
-0.0002 0.0003 
-0.0005*** 
(17.580) 
EXVAL -0.330 0.180 
-0.510*** 
(-2.737) 
-0.119 0.0648 
-0.184*** 
(10.467) 
Financing gap -0.089 -0.020 
-0.069*** 
(-5.384) 
-0.064 -0.049 
-0.015*** 
(8.270) 
IPO activity 0.003 0.004 
-0.0002 
(-0.550) 
0.0008 0.0003 
0.0005*** 
(2.703) 
M & A activity 0.076 0.150 
-0.074 
(-1.078) 
0.041 0.039 
0.002 
(0.020) 
Industry sales 
growth 
-0.030 0.024 
-0.055*** 
(-7.359) 
0.025 0.031 
-0.006** 
(2.613) 
Market share 0.095 0.048 
0.047***  
(7.701) 
0.056 0.005 
0.051*** 
(126.877) 
Largest segment 
profit 
0.073 0.099 
-0.026**  
(-2.178) 
0.100 0.081 
0.019** 
(4.655) 
Sample size 354 3,695  354 3,695  
Notes: The sample covers ECOs completed during the period 1980 - 2013. Assets are measured in millions of US 
dollars (USD). t-stats or Pearson chi2 statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Year Frequency by year Percent 
1980s 68 19.2 
1990s 149 42.08 
After 2000 137 38.69 
Total 354 100 
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Panel C. Additional ECO characteristics 
Statistics 
Equity 
retained 
Market value of 
ECO (Million USD) 
Market value of 
parent (Million USD) 
Total proceeds 
(Million USD) 
Same SIC3 
ECO 
Different SIC2 
ECO 
Same SIC2 but different 
SIC3 ECO 
Mean 66.50% 2,519.159 21,178.497 584.925 - - - 
Median 72.00% 311.400 5,649.530 96.855 - - - 
Number 
of ECOs 
184 259 244 354 155 115 84 
Notes: The sample covers ECOs completed during the period 1980 - 2013. SIC3 (SIC2) = 3 (2) digit standard industrial classification.
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Table 3. Probit model of likelihood of equity carve-out (Dependent variable: ECO dummy)  
Parent variables Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Log sales 0.218*** 0.001*** 
 (13.37) (9.788) 
MTBV 0.029** 0.007** 
 (2.268) (2.284) 
EBITDA/Sales 0.103 0.002 
 (0.940) (0.692) 
Debt/Assets 0.228*** 0.003*** 
 (9.891) (7.331) 
Relative entropy 0.321*** 0.001*** 
 (5.554) (4.147) 
RVA 0.281 0.001 
 (0.907) (0.443) 
RINV -0.012 -0.004 
 (-0.137) (-1.228) 
EXVAL 0.004 0.0008 
 (0.656) (0.079) 
Financing gap -0.089 -0.002 
 (-1.035) (-0.258) 
IPO activity 5.029** 0.059*** 
 (2.577) (3.291) 
M&A activity -0.231 -0.002 
 (-1.325) (-1.481) 
Industry sales growth -0.355* -0.007* 
 (-1.837) (-1.939) 
Market share -0.416** -0.001** 
 (-2.215) (-2.482) 
Largest segment profit -0.326** -0.003** 
 (-2.277) (-2.397) 
Industry FE                  Yes 
Year FE                  Yes 
Number of ECOs 354 
3,695 
0.329 
Control sample 
Pseudo R2 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined according to Eqs. (1), (4) and (5) in Appendix A1. For the definitions 
of the other variables see Table 1. t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. This model includes year and industry fixed effects. 
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Table 4. Change in allocative efficiency and firm value of parents following ECO 
Panel A. Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.025) (-0.914) 
After 0.018** 0.007*** 0.241 
 (2.571) (3.531) (1.303) 
Change 0.018** 0.008*** 0.571** 
 (2.545) (4.147) (3.440) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.011 0.009* -0.147 
 (1.069) (1.801) (-0.817) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
 
Panel B. Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.023) (-0.914) 
After 0.011 0.004*** -0.644 
 (0.164) (4.013) (-0.974) 
Change 0.012 0.005** -0.314 
 (0.203) (2.524) (-0.502) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.098 0.002 0.529*** 
 (0.685) (0.511) (3.977) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix A1. Sample size is 354 ECO parents and 354 control 
firms. The control sample is selected using the Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching procedure. Before is the 
average for each conglomerate company over the window (t = -2 to t = -1 years) in Panel A and (t = -3 to t = -1 
years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year t = 0. The variable After is the average over the window (t = +1 to t = 
+2 years) in Panel A and (t = +1 to t = +3 years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year t = 0, adjusted for the 
corresponding averages of the matched sample. Change is the difference between Before and After. DinD 
treatment effects are the difference between change for treated observations and change for corresponding control 
observations. t stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
And the follo 
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Table 5. ECO effects on allocative efficiency and firm value based on propensity score matching (PSM) and 
Heckman methodologies 
Panel A. Treatment effects Adjusted for matched control firm efficiency using the Dehejia and Wahba PSM 
procedure 
Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.000) (-0.914) 
After 0.013* 0.024** 0.025 
 (1.857) (2.182) (0.926) 
Change 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.355*** 
 (3.500) (5.000) (2.934) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.0231 0.013 0.050* 
 (1.036) (0.500) (1.667) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
 
Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.000) (-0.914) 
After 0.017** 0.025** 0.155** 
 (2.125) (2.273) (2.300) 
Change 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.485*** 
 (4.500) (4.333) (2.580) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.028* 0.002** 0.0603* 
 (1.867) (2.222) (1.774) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
Notes: Panel A and Panel B present the results of analysis of the effects of carve-outs on allocative efficiency and 
firm value of parents. RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix A1. Sample size is 354 ECO parents and 
354 control firms. The control sample is selected using the Dahejia and Wahba PSM procedure.  Before is the 
average for each conglomerate company over the window (t = -2 to t = -1 years) in Panel A and (t = -3 to t = -1 
years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year t = 0. The variable After is the average over the window (t = +1 to t = 
+2 years) in Panel A and (t = +1 to t = +3 years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year t = 0, adjusted for the 
corresponding averages of the matched sample. Change is the difference between Before and After. DinD 
treatment effects are the difference between change for treated observations and change for corresponding control 
observations. t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Panel B. Heckman bias-adjusted change in allocative efficiency and firm value  
Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
Variable RINV RVA EXVAL 
Heckman_Treated 0.027* 0.001 0.135*** 
 (1.929) (0.228) (5.625) 
Heckman_Controls -0.038*** -0.010*** -0.727*** 
 (-3.167) (-2.503) (-2.077) 
InvMills 0.011*** 0.002** 0.224** 
 (3.667) (2.205) (2.113) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
 
Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
Variable RINV RVA EXVAL 
Heckman_Treated 0.008** 0.003*** 0.113*** 
 (2.112) (3.166) (5.136) 
Heckman_Controls -0.014*** -0.004*** -0.668*** 
 (-6.968) (-6.667) (-7.506) 
InvMills 0.003*** 0.004** 0.206*** 
 (4.286) (2.175) (7.103) 
Number of ECOs 354 354 354 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix A1. The variables labelled ‘Heckman_Treated’ 
correspond to the sum of (α+β
1
) in the regression, ∆ 𝑆𝑛(𝑇𝑛)= α + β1T𝑛 + β2InvMills + εn (see equation 3 in text) 
where α represents the average change in allocative efficiency in the sample of non-restructuring companies and 
the sum of (α+β
1
) captures the average change in allocative efficiency in the carve-out sample. ∆S is defined as 
the change in allocative efficiency and conglomerate valuation and T𝑛  is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if the company performs a carve-out and 0 otherwise. In addition, β
2
 is defined as the coefficient on the variable 
used to adjust for self-selection bias in the Heckman regression. ‘Heckman_Controls’ captures the value of α in 
the Heckman regression. t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively.
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Table 6. Governance characteristics of ECO parents 
Panel A. Event window (-2, +2) years  
Average 
Board 
duality 
Board size 
Board 
indep. 
Number 
of instit. 
investors 
Share of 
instit. 
investors 
CEO total 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO cash 
comp. (Million 
USD) 
CEO non-cash 
comp. 
(Million 
USD) 
CEO 
tenure 
Analyst 
coverage 
Analyst 
forecast 
dispersion 
Before 0.553*** 11.529*** 4.948*** 1.979*** 0.190*** 4.899*** 1.822*** 3.153*** 5.920*** 11.021*** 0.165*** 
 (12.61) (20.899) (18.767) (11.868) (11.187) (8.264) (10.874) (6.034) (9.639) (16.488) (8.397) 
After 0.541*** 11.131*** 5.534*** 2.107*** 0.179*** 6.244*** 1.856*** 4.372*** 5.560*** 16.441*** 0.199*** 
 (12.357) (22.744) (19.971) (10.879) (10.084) (9.024) (10.177) (6.894) (15.148) (19.184) (10.371) 
Change -0.012 -0.398** 0.586*** 0.127 -0.011 1.345*** 0.034 1.218.96** -0.359 5.420*** 0.033** 
 (-0.467) (-2.610) (3.098) (1.052) (-0.857) (3.356) (0.294) (2.906) (-0.614) (12.297) (2.134) 
Number of 
ECOs 
122 122 122 98 98 123 123 123 157 147 147 
 
Panel B. Event window (-3, +3) years 
Average 
Board 
duality 
Board size 
Board 
indep. 
Number 
of instit. 
investors 
Share of 
instit. 
investors 
CEO total 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO cash 
comp. (Million 
USD) 
CEO non-cash 
comp. 
(Million 
USD) 
CEO 
tenure 
Analyst 
coverage 
Analyst 
forecast 
dispersion 
Before 0.585*** 11.851*** 4.962*** 2.300*** 0.190*** 3.786*** 1.642*** 2.172*** 6.270*** 11.017*** 0.158*** 
 (12.840) (17.330) (17.126) (12.723) (10.104) (9.714) (10.268) (6.555) (10.192) (15.169) (7.483) 
After 0.599*** 11.387*** 5.678*** 2.371*** 0.177*** 5.394*** 1.850*** 3.560*** 5.932*** 17.108*** 0.188*** 
 (13.583) (18.414) (19.011) (11.232) (9.192) (9.524) (9.909) (6.803) (14.580) (18.187) (8.642) 
Change 0.014 -0.464** 0.716*** 0.070 -0.013 1.607*** 0.208* 1.387*** -0.338 6.091*** 0.029* 
 (0.498) (-2.637) (3.303) (0.452) (-0.888) (3.902) (1.723) (3.307) (-0.538) (12.268) (1.789) 
Number of 
ECOs 
94 94 94 81 81 102 102 102 127 120 120 
Notes: Before is the average for each conglomerate company over the window (t = -2 to t = -1 years) in Panel A and (t = -3 to t = -1 years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year 
t = 0. The variable After is the average over the window (t = +1 to t = +2 years) in Panel A and (t = +1 to t = +3 years) in Panel B relative to the ECO year t = 0. The variable 
Change is defined as the difference between Before and After. T-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   
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Table 7. Governance characteristics of ECO offspring  
Panel A: Event window (0, +2) years 
Average 
Board 
duality 
Board 
size 
Board 
indep. 
Number of 
instit. 
investors 
Share of 
instit. 
investors 
CEO total 
comp. 
(Million 
USD) 
CEO cash 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO non-cash 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO 
tenure 
Analyst 
coverage 
Analyst 
forecast 
dispersion 
Before 0.574*** 7.515*** 3.807*** 1.839*** 0.203*** 2.589*** 0.947*** 1.678*** 1.669*** 3.493*** 0.173** 
 (13.474) (26.870) (18.402) (8.452) (8.662) (6.341) (7.706) (4.627) (4.868) (20.715) (2.433) 
After 0.576*** 8.169*** 4.019*** 2.395*** 0.233*** 2.136*** 0.910*** 1.235*** 3.397*** 6.015*** 0.808 
 (13.679) (28.820) (20.610) (10.891) (10.543) (6.566) (9.816) (4.375) (9.803) (16.865) (1.338) 
Change 0.007 0.654*** 0.216** 0.555*** 0.030 -0/453 -0.036 -0.442 1.728*** 2.521*** 0.634 
 (0.446) (3.916) (1.978) (3.603) (1.332) ( -1.421) (-0.458) (-1.383) (17.804) (9.285) (1.186) 
Number of 
ECOs 
136 136 136 81 81 81 81 81 136 206 206 
 
Panel B: Event window (0, +3) years 
Average 
Board 
duality 
Board 
size 
Board 
indep. 
Number of 
instit. 
investors 
Share of 
instit. 
investors 
CEO total 
comp. 
(Million 
USD) 
CEO cash 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO non-cash 
comp. 
(Million USD) 
CEO 
tenure 
Analyst 
coverage 
Analyst 
forecast 
dispersion 
Before 0.587*** 7.611*** 3.923*** 1.855*** 0.189*** 2.665*** 0.996*** 1.710*** 2.616*** 3.467*** 0.181** 
 (13.054) (25.238) (17.359) (8.981) (7.410) (5.814) (7.035) (4.182) (4.373) (20.201) (2.335) 
After 0.860*** 8.397*** 3.968*** 2.304*** 0.228*** 2.105*** 0.971** 1.143*** 4.849*** 6.259*** 0.830 
 (27.095) (28.381) (16.635) (10.453) (9.378) (6.050) (7.9570) (3.840) (8.10) (15.644) (1.279) 
Change 0.273*** 0.785*** 0.045 0.449** 0.039 -0.560 -0.024 -0.478 2.232*** 2.792*** 0.648 
 (5.810) (3.670) (0.258) (2.300) (1.506) (-1.535) (-0.179) (-1.582) (6.740) (8.524) (1.130) 
Number of 
ECOs 
121 121 121 69 69 81 81 81 121 189 189 
Notes: Before is the governance characteristic for each offspring at t=0. After is the governance variable for each offspring in two (or three) years after the completion of the 
ECO. The variable Change is defined as the difference between Before and After t-stats are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  
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Table 8. Impact of changes in governance following ECO on allocative efficiency and valuation of parents 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Change in allocative efficiency and valuation over the event window (-2, +2) years 
 Model 1: ∆ RINV Model 2: ∆ RVA Model 3: ∆ EXVAL 
∆ Analyst coverage 0.195*** -0.016 -0.329 
 (3.804) (-1.061) (-0.123) 
∆ Board indep. -0.048 0.024*** -3.149 
 (-1.475) (2.942) (-1.487) 
∆ Board size 0.353 -0.041** -3.730** 
 (1.049) (-2.549) (-2.155) 
∆ Shares of instit. 
investors 
0.034** 0.057 0.110 
 (2.224) (1.116) (1.439) 
∆ CEO tenure -0.002 0.075 0.260 
 (-0.451) (0.808) (1.089) 
Board duality 0.093 0.042 -0.089 
 (1.020) (0.040) (-0.072) 
∆ CEO cash comp. 0.136 -0.058* 0.219 
 (1.108) (-1.763) (0.193) 
∆ CEO non-cash comp. -0.024 0.018** -0.048 
 (-0.939) (2.104) (-0.073) 
∆  Analyst forecast 
dispersion 
-0.216 -0.033 0.832 
 (-1.412) (-0.727) (0.200) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of ECOs 93 93 93 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.341 0.268 
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Change in allocative efficiency and valuation over the event window (-3, +3) years 
Notes: The dependent variable in each model is the change in allocative efficiency (RINV in Model 1 and RVA 
in Model 2) or valuation (EXVAL in Model 3) adjusted by the change in the matched control firm where each 
control firm is identified using the AI matching estimator. Please refer to Table 1, the Sample and Methodology 
Section 3 and Appendix A1 for detailed definitions of the dependent and independent variables. t-stats are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All Models 
include year and industry fixed effects.
 Model 1: ∆ RINV Model 2: ∆ RVA Model 3: ∆ EXVAL 
∆ Analyst coverage 0.021** 0.763** 0.418** 
 (2.491) (2.703) (2.631) 
∆ Board indep. 0.002*** 0.548** 0.516 
 (4.042) (2.454) (0.936) 
∆ Board size -0.004 -0.021* -0.371* 
 (-1.391) (-1.767) (-1.834) 
∆ Shares of instit. investors 0.009** 0.035 0.111** 
 (2.668) (1.449) (2.376) 
∆ CEO tenure 0.077 0.051 0147 
 (1.411) (0.615) (0.829) 
Board duality 0.164 -0.118 -0.534* 
 (1.396) (-0.337) (-1.959) 
∆ CEO cash comp. 0.008 0.033 0.510 
 (1.491) (0.559) (1.199) 
∆ CEO non-cash comp. 0.002* 0.004*** 0.006** 
 (1.895) (3.648) (2.418) 
∆ Analyst forecast dispersion -0.003 -0.360 -0.002 
 (-0.561) (-1.182) (-0.436) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of ECOs 93 93 93 
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.331 0.252 
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Table 9. Difference-in-difference (DinD) analysis of effect of changes in governance following carve-out on 
parent allocative efficiency and valuation. 
 
Panel A: Analysis of change in allocative efficiency and valuation over the event window (-2, +2) years 
 
Panel B: Analysis of change in allocative efficiency and valuation over the event window (-3, +3) years 
 Model 1: ∆ RINV Model 2: ∆ RVA Model 3: ∆ EXVAL 
DinD_∆ Analyst coverage 0.115 0.0111 0.139*** 
 (1.310) (1.614) (11.575) 
DinD_∆ Board indep. 0.233* 0.0311*** 0.169** 
 (1.908) (4.925) (1.974) 
DinD_∆ Board size 0.134 -0.147*** -0.897*** 
 (0.488) (-8.984) (-6.474) 
DinD_Board duality 0.784 -0.178*** -0.120*** 
 (1.642) (-2.871) (-2.449) 
DinD ∆ CEO cash comp. -0.208 0.002 0.712*** 
 (-1.433) (0.270) (3.890) 
DinD_∆ CEO non-cash comp.  -0.057 0.016*** 0.682** 
 (-1.479) (7.669) (2.313) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of ECOs 93 93 93 
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.313 0.231 
Notes: The dependent variable in each model is the change in allocative efficiency (RINV in Model 1 and RVA 
in Model 2) or valuation (EXVAL in Model 3) adjusted by the change in the matched control firm where each 
control firm is identified using the AI matching estimator. Please refer to Table 1, the Sample and Methodology 
Section 3 and Appendix A1 for detailed definitions of the dependent and independent variables. The independent 
variables in each model are also adjusted by the change in the matched control firm sample where each control 
firm is identified using the AI matching procedure. t-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects.
 Model 1: ∆ RINV Model 2: ∆ RVA Model 3: ∆ EXVAL 
DinD_∆ Analyst coverage 0.715*** 0.002 0.603*** 
 (4.129) (0.979) (3.407) 
DinD_∆ Board indep. 0.005 0.188* 0.041 
 (0.049) (1.937) (0.862) 
DinD_∆ Board size -0.241*** -0.151 -0.984** 
 (-2.813) (-0.799) (-2.301) 
DinD_Board duality -0.025 -0.799* -0.897*** 
 (-1.811) (-1.848) (-2.920) 
DinD ∆ CEO cash comp. 0.004*** 0.003* 0.019 
 2.953 (1.789) (1.078) 
DinD_∆ CEO non-cash comp.  0.002*** 0.015* 0.003** 
 (3.551) (1.957) (2.235) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of ECOs 93 93 93 
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.315 0.261 
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Appendices 
Appendix A1. Definitions of RINV, RVA and EXVAL 
We compute RINV as follows. We first calculate the median q (the numerator of q is calculated as the book value 
of assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus deferred taxes. The denominator of q equals 
the book value of assets) of the pure play (i.e. single-segment) companies operating in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as a segment of the parent portfolio and then rank the segments by size of these q’s. Suppose the first k 
segments have industry median q’s greater than the sales-weighted average of all the segments’ industry median 
q’s. Let Sj be the sales of segment j, 𝑤𝑗  be the proportion of company sales made by segment j, 𝐼𝑗 be the capital 
expenditure of segment j, and (
I
S
)
j
SS
 be the capital expenditure to sales ratio of the median pure play company 
operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as segment j. Then, RINV is calculated as: 
 
RINVS≡ ∑ wj
k
j=1 {
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
i=1 [
Ii
Si
- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]} - ∑ wj
n
j=n-k+i {
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
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Ii
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- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]}                        (1) 
 where 
[
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
]                                                                                                                                                                (2) 
represents investment to sales ratio of segment j adjusted by its industry median and 
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
i=1 [
Ii
Si
- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]                                                                                                                                     (3) 
represents the industry- and firm-adjusted investment to sales ratio. Eq. (1) implies that, after adjusting for 
industry- and firm-investment levels, RINVS will be higher when companies invest more in their high-q segments, 
i.e. when they are more efficient.  
If 𝑞𝑗  is the industry median q of segment j, the relative value added measure that uses sales as the 
denominator of each ratio, RVA is: 
RVA= ∑ wj(qj-q̅)
n
j=1 {
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
i=1 [
Ii
Si
- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]}                                                                                                (4) 
where ?̅?  is the sales-weighted average of all of the segment industry median q’s. To help understand the 
interpretation of RVA let us assume that we have a conglomerate firm where the sales of the different segments 
are all the same. In this case RVA represents the covariance between industry-adjusted segment investment and 
industry median q. Since the different conglomerate segments have typically different segment levels RVA can be 
thought of as the sales-weighted covariance between investment and q. Higher values of RVA indicate higher 
levels of allocative efficiency. 
This variable is defined as: 
Excess Value= (
V
S
)
i
- ∑ wj (
V
S
)
j
SS
n
j=1                                                                                                                           (5) 
where 𝑤𝑗  is the proportion of company sales made by segment j, (
V
S
)
j
SS
is the median market value of equity to 
sales ratio for the three digit SIC-industry in which segment j operates, and (
V
S
)
𝑖
is the market value to sales ratio 
for the entire conglomerate. Higher values of EXVAL demonstrate improvements in company valuation. EXVAL 
is, however, an indirect measure of allocative efficiency and could be influenced by other value-relevant factors 
affecting the firm and not just change in allocative efficiency.
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Appendix A2: A note on the Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching procedure 
We discuss the general problem of obtaining consistent treatment effect estimates here. Let T be a variable which 
takes the value of one if a company decides to perform a carve-out and zero otherwise. Let 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) be the level of 
allocative efficiency as a function of T for observation n. Using this notation, 𝐸(𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) represent the 
expected effect of restructuring (the treatment) on the group of refocusing firms (treated group). Likewise, 
𝐸(𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) represents the ‘counterfactual’ expected effect of deciding not to refocus, given that the firm 
engaged in refocusing (i.e. treatment took place). In our analysis we examine the change in 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) relative to its 
level before the refocusing, which is denoted as ∆𝑆𝑛(𝑇). By taking the change in the allocative efficiency we can 
control for time-invariant and unobservable differences between the refocusing and non-restructuring (control) 
subsamples. This procedure is like differencing to remove fixed effects in a panel data set.  
We estimate the average impact of the decision to refocus on allocative efficiency for a group of 
companies that decided to refocus, i.e. the average treatment impact on the treated: 
θ|𝑇=1 ≡ 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1) − ∆𝑆𝑛(0)|𝑇 = 1        (1) 
Since we cannot directly measure the effect of both the decision to refocus and the decision not to refocus on the 
same company, 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) represents a hypothetical event that cannot be observed. 
Previous studies on the impact of refocusing on company allocative efficiency have measured: 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1)            (2) 
by averaging the difference in allocative efficiency for refocusing companies before and after the refocusing event. 
The problem with this method is that, in any case apart from when𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) = 0. The latter situation 
would happen if the companies that engaged in refocusing would not have experienced any change in allocative 
efficiency in the absence of the refocusing. This condition would only be true if the act of refocusing is the sole 
way to enhance allocative efficiency or if the refocusing companies have no other characteristics that impact 
allocative efficiency. The first requirement is false and the second one is a matter that can be determined only 
empirically.  
Since we cannot observe θ|𝑇=1, we need to make certain assumptions to estimate the unobservable part 
of the function: 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1). The typical assumption in the treatment effects literature is that allocation to 
treatment is random, dependent on a group of observable pre-treatment characteristics (i.e. observable variables 
that distinguish between refocusing and non-restructuring firms), Z. Simple matching procedures use this 
assumption by matching each treated observation to one or more untreated observations with similar pre-treatment 
characteristics, Z. Then, 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1)  is estimated by taking the average of ∆𝑆𝑛(0)  over the matches 
(control subsample). This makes it possible to obtain an estimate of θ|𝑇=1  by taking the difference between 
∆𝑆𝑛(1) and estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1). This type of treatment effect estimation is usually performed without 
replacement (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).  
Simple matching estimators described above are asymptotically biased when the vector of company 
characteristics Z contains more than one variable. When the matches of treated and non-treated observations are 
not exact, the treatment effects estimator is asymptotically biased. Abadie and Imbens (2006) (AI) introduce 
matching with replacement to minimise the asymptotic bias and estimate a term that corrects for the bias. The bias 
correction is only necessary for the estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) as the term 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) can be observed 
directly and is an estimate of the difference between two components. The first component is the impact of 
treatment on the control subsample with perfect matching. The second component is the actual impact of treatment 
on the control subsample. To obtain these two terms it is necessary to estimate the conditional expectation of 
∆𝑆𝑛(0) given 𝑍𝑛 which is given by regressing ∆𝑆𝑛(0) on 𝑍𝑛 based on the control subsample. To estimate the 
conditional expectation, we need to take 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) ≡ 𝛽0̂ + 𝛽1̂𝑍𝑛, where 𝛽0̂, a scalar, and 𝛽1̂, a vector with the same 
dimension as 𝑍𝑛, are the estimated coefficients from the regression. The bias corrected estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 =
1) is equal to the simple regression estimate presented above plus a component which we denote as 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) −
𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑖). This component is defined as the difference between the predicted values of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) using a group of 
controls for the nth treated observation and the group of controls for its associated match.  
